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Abstract: This paper reviews literature addressing the beneﬁts and costs of the Bureau

of Land Management’s Wild Horse and Burro (WHB) Program. Within the framework of a
comprehensive beneﬁt cost analysis of the WHB Program, I ﬁnd that program cost estimates
are readily available from numerous sources. A more limited set of estimates of the opportunity
cost of WHB on the range is available, as is a single estimate of the beneﬁts provided by
animal adoption. In contrast, there are no economic estimates of ecological damages caused
by WHB in excess of the Appropriate Management Level, nor does a search of the literature
reveal any estimate of the use and nonuse beneﬁts of having WHB on the range. Dynamic
bioeconomic models—which would be ideal for analysis of intertemporal program beneﬁts
and costs—have been restricted, for the most part, to only the analysis of costs. Further, I
demonstrate how published opportunity cost estimates have sometimes been misinterpreted.
This study sorts out confusion regarding reported opportunity costs and, using the missing
elements of the comprehensive beneﬁt cost analysis as a guide, identiﬁes a path for future
research.
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Beginning with the 1971 Wild FreeRoaming Horses and Burros Act, the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) became responsible
for managing horses and burros on the public
range in the United States. The legislation
mandated that the BLM control wild horse
(Equus ferus caballus) and burro (E. asinus; WHB)
populations to achieve a thriving ecological
balance with other plant and animal species
(Figure 1). Under its WHB Program, the BLM
establishes an Appropriate Management Level
(AML) for a given range unit and tries to keep the
population at or beneath the AML. Its primary
population control methods are removing
animals from the range to long-term holding
facilities, adopting out removed animals to
households, and applying contraceptives to
mares. Other methods of population control,
such as euthanasia and slaughter for food, are
prohibited by law.
Three trends have dominated in recent
years: removal activities have been scaled back,
animal adoptions are now less than half what
they were in 2002, and contraceptive methods
are not applied to enough animals to eﬀectively
control the aggregate size of the WHB herd

(BLM 2017b). Consequently, the population
of animals in long-term holding facilities has
grown rapidly, as has the on-range population.
The number of animals cared for by the BLM
has grown from about 5,000 in FY99 to >45,000
in FY17 (Department of the Interior [DOI]
2016); the number of free-roaming animals on
the range has grown from just >42,000 in 1996
to almost 73,000 in 2017 (BLM 2017a). Given
that the WHB population doubles every 5
years or so (NRC 2013), failure to eﬀectively
control WHB populations could result in severe
ecological consequences for public rangelands
and vastly increased program costs (Figure 2).
The National Research Council (NRC) and
BLM have studied the WHB issue intensively
yet, curiously, little concentrated attention
has been given to the full array of economic
aspects of WHB management (NRC 2013). The
WHB economics literature remains scattered
across oﬃcial government reports, the refereed
literature, and the gray literature. Without
claiming to be exhaustive, this study attempts
to gather the bulk of that literature into a single
place. Such an approach allows not only for
cross-study comparisons but also identifies
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on the public range. The paper concludes with
a summary and recommendations for future
research.

Beneﬁt cost analysis

Figure 1. The Wild and Free-Roaming Horse and
Burro Act mandated that the Departments of the
Interior and Agriculture manage wild horse (Equus
ferus caballus) and burro (E. asinus) populations
to achieve a thriving ecological balance with other
plant and animal species. Horses of the MaverickMedicine Horse Management Area wait for their
turn for a drink of the scarce water resource on
degraded rangeland (photo courtesy of the Bureau
of Land Management).

Figure 2. Dolly Varden Springs in Antelope Valley,
Nevada, USA. The Appropriate Management Level
of this area is 464 horses (Equus ferus caballus),
and currently there are 3,160 horses. There is no
livestock grazing in this area, which used to be a
riparian habitat. The spring is privately owned and
legally the landowner could fence out horses (photo
courtesy of B. Masters).

the key aspects of a benefit cost analysis that
have yet to be studied. I begin by reviewing
the elements of a comprehensive benefit cost
analysis. The review then turns to the cost
side, examining per-animal average costs of
major BLM programmatic functions and the
opportunity costs of WHB on the range. On the
benefits side, econometric models of adoption
and sale of horses and burros are reviewed,
as well as the unintended consequences of
the horse slaughter ban on the fees paid to
adopt or purchase wild horses. I then look at
dynamic bioeconomic models that capture the
intertemporal dimensions of WHB and livestock

Benefit cost analysis (BCA) is a comprehensive
approach to evaluating all economic aspects
of a given public policy into a single metric:
the net benefits of a policy program. Within
the context of wild horses and burros, the
methodology can help determine (1) whether
the benefits of managing WHB populations
exceed the costs of managing those populations
and (2) the optimal scale (population) at which
WHB should be managed. Hyde (1978) laid out
the problem concisely by noting that benefits
of management include the recreational value
of viewing WHB, the nonuse benefits of
WHB (such as those who value the vicarious
experience of knowing horses are on the range),
and the benefits garnered by those participating
in the WHB adoption and sale program. Costs
include explicit program costs, opportunity
costs of displacement of other wildlife species
and domestic livestock from the public range,
and ecological damage to the range of excess
WHB populations. The major programmatic
functions of the BLM (i.e., gathering animals,
applying fertility controls, removing animals
from the range for adoption, sale, or placement
in long-term holding) are supposed to achieve
an AML, which is the primary choice variable.
Mathematically, one can lay out the arguments
of Hyde’s (1978) BCA proposal as a net benefits
function,
NB(AML) = [UV(AML) + NUV(AML) +
ASV(AML)] – [PC(AML) + OC(AML) + EC(AML)]
where net benefits (NB) are the diﬀerence
between total benefits and total costs. Total
benefits consist of use values (UV), nonuse
values (NUV), and adoption/sales values
(ASV). Total costs are program costs (PC),
opportunity costs (OC), and ecological costs
(EC). All benefits and costs flow from the
choice of an AML. The BCA would identify the
optimal program scale by choosing an AML
such that net benefits are at a maximum; the
optimal AML is determined where the benefit
of having an additional animal on the range is
exactly equal to the additional cost incurred.
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Hyde (1978) recommended that the AML be
determined for individual herd management
areas because benefits and costs were likely
to vary geographically. That said, the BLM’s
selection of an AML cannot have been the result of
a carefully considered BCA because economists
have yet to estimate values for all of the benefit
and cost categories needed to implement the
Hyde model. Instead, economists (and others)
have focused mostly on costs and benefits that
are easiest to measure, namely, program costs,
opportunity costs, and the adoption market.

Costs: program costs
Adjusted to constant 2017 dollars, the BLM’s
annual WHB program budget has grown at
a compound annual rate of >7.5%, from $21.5
million in FY98 to almost $80 million in FY16
(DOI 2016). Much of the increase in program
costs is due to the growth in the number of
animals held by BLM in short-term corrals and,
for those animals not adopted, pastured over the
long-term. Oﬀ-range holding costs have grown
to comprise nearly two-thirds of the BLM’s
WHB budget in recent years. Growth in the total
budget of the BLM has not kept pace with its
obligation to support an ever larger number of
oﬀ-range animals, so its budget for gathers and
removal has fallen. This tradeoﬀ has led directly
to the increase in the on-range population
(Garrott and Oli 2013, DOI 2016, Garrott 2018).
Average cost information for major
programmatic functions are shown in Table
1. All costs have been converted to constant
2017 dollars (some studies have used costs
from diﬀerent years and failed to adjust for
the changing value of a dollar). Total costs
consist of fixed costs—costs that do not vary
with the number of animals treated, such as
administrative expenses—and variable costs
such as holding costs and fertility control,
which do vary by the number treated. The
average cost is simply total cost divided by the
number of animals treated. In general, years in
which a large number of animals are included
under a given programmatic function should
have lower average costs because fixed costs
can be spread over more animals.
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range and the number of mares treated with
contraceptives, and it did not provide a count
of the total number gathered (BLM 2017a).
Reports for FY11 through FY15 show that the
number of animals gathered exceeded the sum
of those removed or contraceptively treated
by an average of 10.4%. I estimate the number
of animals gathered in FY16 by increasing the
sum of removals and contraceptively-treated
mares by this percentage.
Average cost estimates for gather of animals
from the range appear in the top portion of Table
1. Costs for FY12 through FY16 were calculated
by dividing program costs by the number of
animals gathered. Total program costs for
FY11 were reported by Hooks (n.d.) and then
supplemented with BLM (2017a) gather data to
calculate the average cost of gathering. Finally,
Bartholow (2007) reported average gather costs
for 10 western states but noted that fixed costs
and gather size greatly aﬀected the average
cost for each state. The cost figure appearing in
Table 1 is the Olympic mean (the average after
dropping the highest and lowest cost) for the 10
western states.
Gather costs range from a low of $418 per
animal to a high of almost $1,100 per animal.
The pattern of average costs does not follow
economic predictions (e.g., average costs for
4,500 animals in FY15 are lower than average
costs for >10,000 animals in FY12), suggesting
some flexibility in the BLM’s budget, either from
year to year or among programmatic functions
within a given year. Perhaps the best estimate
of gather costs can be obtained by summing
the budget between FY11 through FY16 ($28.1
million) and dividing by the total number of
animals gathered (about 35,900) to obtain a peranimal average gather cost of $782.71.

Off-range holding costs

The BLM uses corrals in the short-term to
treat gathered animals with veterinary and
farrier services and to provide halter and/or
saddle training in preparation for the adoption
market (Figure 3). Caring for WHB in corrals
also requires feeding animals with purchased
hay. Animals that are not adopted are
transferred to privately contracted pastures for
Gather costs
the remainder of the animal’s life. Thus, shortIn its FY16 report, the BLM provided only term holding costs exceed those of long-term
the number of animals removed from the holding facilities (DOI 2016).
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Table 1. Unit costs for major functions of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Wild Horse and
Burro Program (constant $2017)a.
Fiscal year

Budget ($M)

Animals (#)

Cost per animal

Source/notes

Average cost, gathers
2016

$3.11

3,869

$803.82

BLM (2017a)

2015

$1.89

4,515

$417.71

BLM (2017a)

2014

$1.25

1,860

$670.90

BLM (2017a)

2013

$5.09

4,702

$1,082.71

BLM (2017a)

2012

$8.40

10,465

$802.77

BLM (2017a)

2011

$8.38

10,504

$797.35

Hooks n.d., BLM (2017a)

$483.27

Bartholow (2007)

2004

Olympic mean of 10 western states
Average cost, oﬀ-range holding
2016

$50.22

45,044

$3.05/day

BLM (2017a); STH and LTHb

2015

$50.81

47,393

$2.94/day

BLM (2017a); STH and LTH

2014

$44.96

48,194

$2.56/day

BLM (2017a); STH and LTH

2013

$48.96

49,472

$2.71/day

BLM (2017a); STH and LTH

2012

$46.26

46,891

$2.70/day

BLM (2017a); STH and LTH

2011

$50.30

42,835

$3.22/day

Garrott and Oli (2013); STH and LTH

2011

$29.94

11,682

$7.02/day

Hooks n.d., BLM (2017a); STH

2008

$5.80/day

GAO (2008); STH

2004

$4.53/day

Batholow (2007); STH

2001

$4.05/day

GAO (2008); STH

$1.59/day

Hooks n.d., BLM (2017a); LTH

2008

$1.45/day

GAO (2008); LTH

2001

$1.62/day

GAO (2008); LTH

2011

$17.41

30,012

Average cost, adoption and sales
2016

$7.49

3,116

$2,404.69

BLM (2017a)

2015

$6.49

2,898

$2,240.45

BLM (2017a)

2014

$4.78

2,222

$2,152.81

BLM (2017a)

2013

$7.95

2,376

$3,347.88

BLM (2017a)

2012

$7.65

2,985

$2,561.83

BLM (2017a)

2011

$7.97

2,844

$2,802.76

Hooks n.d., BLM Public Land Statistics

2004

$486.14

Bartholow (2007)
Olympic mean of 10 western states

a
b

All dollar figures adjusted by GDP price deflator to constant $2017.
STH (short-term holding); LTH (long-term holding).
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The middle portion of Table 1 presents
average holding costs for removed animals.
The BLM program data (BLM 2017a) can
be used to calculate average holding costs
without distinguishing between short-term
holding (STH) and long-term holding (LTH).
Data for FY12 through FY16 showed rising
average costs, from $2.70 per day increasing to
$3.05 per day. Garrott and Oli (2013) reported
an annual per-animal holding cost for FY11,
which was converted to a per-day figure and
adjusted to constant 2017 dollars. This average
cost ($3.22 per day) was slightly higher than,
but still comparable to, the FY12–FY16 figures.
Using BLM data on the total expenditures for
holding facilities in FY11 through FY16 ($291.5
million) and dividing by the total number of
animals in those facilities over the same time
period (280,000) yields an estimate of about
$2.85 per day.
Short-term and long-term costs are shown
for selected years as reported in the literature.
The STH average costs range between $4.05
and $7.02 per day; although there were only 4
observations, the pattern shows that STH costs
appear to be rising over time. Three estimates
of LTH costs range from $1.45 per day to $1.62
per day. The diﬀerence between mean STH
and mean LTH costs in Table 1 is $3.80, which
is quite comparable to the diﬀerence ($3.62,
constant $2017) reported by DOI (2016).

Adoption and sales costs
The final portion of Table 1 reports on average
per-animal costs of the BLM’s adoption/sales
program. The BLM (2017a) data were used to
calculate average adoption and sales costs for
FY12 through FY16; Hooks (n.d.) reported the
total BLM adoption budget for FY11, which
was then supplemented with adoption and
sales data from BLM Public Land Statistics.
Average per-animal adoption costs over the
6 fiscal years ranged from $2,153 (FY14) to
$3,348 (FY13). Following a similar procedure
to that used for gather and holding costs, the
mean adoption/sale average cost over 6 years is
$2,575.39. It is unclear how these costs compare
to that provided by Bartholow (2007), which
was lower by a factor of five. The Bartholow
(2007) figure is the Olympic mean of the average
costs for 10 western states, which may mask the
eﬀect of diﬀering numbers of animals adopted
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across states, as well as diﬀering proportions of
fixed and variable costs.

Costs: opportunity costs of WHB
on the public range
The principal opportunity cost associated
with growing on-range populations of freeroaming horses and burros is displacement
of other wildlife species and livestock that
compete for the same forage resources. The
literature reports opportunity costs in diﬀerent
ways: marginal costs versus average costs,
costs reported for a single year versus costs
discounted over a much longer timeframe,
and costs that are restricted only to losses to
ranchers versus those that include non-market
losses. Here, I sort through the literature and
make recommendations as to which costs
should be used when.

Market plus non-market opportunity
costs
Based on a FY98 population of on-range
animals (47,400), Pimentel et al. (2005) estimated
annual foregone forage losses of $7.1 million
(constant $2017), or an average of $149.32 per
wild horse or burro per year. The authors
provided no information about how their
initial figure was determined, but the context
of the study makes it reasonable to assume
that the value estimate is for displacement of
both cattle (Bos taurus) and other wildlife such
as elk (Cervus canadensis), bighorn sheep (Ovis
canadensis), deer, etc. It is unclear if the value
included other ecological damages associated
with excess WHB populations.
Bastian et al. (1999) developed a linear
programming model to estimate the forgone cost
of wild horses on a 36,000-ha range allotment
in Wyoming, USA administered by the BLM.
The objective function of the programming
model maximized the number of animals on
the range subject to diﬀerent stocking levels of
horses. Other species using the range were elk,
mule deer (Odocoileus hemionus), pronghorn
(Antilocapra americana), and cattle. Seasonal
forage constraints were developed according
to the forage preferences for each species; total
forage consumption across all species was not
permitted to exceed 50% of range productivity.
Opportunity costs were measured as the
foregone value of hunting (elk, mule deer, and
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Figure 3. The Bureau of Land Management uses short-term facilities to treat gathered animals with
veterinary and farrier services, and to provide halter and/or saddle training in preparation for the adoption
market (photo courtesy of E. Thacker).

pronghorn) and reduced ranch profits (cattle);
the opportunity cost for wildlife species was
set equal to the average consumer surplus per
hunting trip per animal displaced.
The objective function gave all species
an equal weight. As rangeland forage was
consumed by an increasing number of wild
horses, the model’s seasonal forage constraints
determined which of the other species (wildlife
and/or cattle) were to be removed from the
range. Relative to the baseline (0 horses), adding
128 horses to the allotment required a reduction
of 449 cattle, 90 mule deer, and 1 antelope.
No elk were removed. Similar analyses were
conducted for 184, 196, and 241 horses. The
present value of total foregone costs for the first
128 horses was $25,000 (constant $2017), for
an average opportunity cost of $195 per horse.
For this first group of horses this is also equal
to the marginal cost. A marginal increase of 56
horses (to 184) results in a further reduction of
156 mule deer and 187 cattle, with concomitant
average and marginal costs of $278 and $467
per horse, respectively.
As even more horses are added to the
allotment, forage constraints begin to bite
seriously: a marginal increase of 12 horses (to
196 total horses) reduces stocking of another
343 antelope, 286 mule deer, and 11 head of
cattle. This displacement of wildlife and cattle

resulted in average opportunity costs of $534
and marginal opportunity costs of $4,453 (or, as
reported in the original publication, $1,992 in
constant $1982). When 241 horses were stocked,
average and marginal costs increased to $1,524
and $5,839, respectively. It is diﬃcult to
compare the Bastian et al. (1999) and Pimentel
et al. (2005) studies because the latter study
provided no information about how the value
was derived.

Market opportunity costs only
Another measure of opportunity cost comes
from Resource Concepts ([RCI] 2017). The
WHB population on the Ely (Nevada, USA)
BLM district was far in excess of its AML: some
9,382 horses were on the range in 2017, yet the
district-wide AML was only 1,695 animals. At
1.3 animal unit months (AUM) per horse, this
means that nearly 120,000 AUMs were being
consumed in excess of the AML in FY17. The
study reported a BLM grazing permit value
of $127 per AUM (based on recent grazing
permit transactions) and a production value
of $84 per AUM, which RCI (2017) equated to
foregone ranch income. Both figures were used
to estimate the opportunity cost to ranchers of
wild horses on the range, but the authors failed
to recognize that these values were inconsistent
with one another.
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One can discern the inconsistency by
thinking of the $84 annual income per AUM
as an annuity, A, to permit holders (i.e., the
income that flows year after year to permit
holders), in perpetuity. (Permits have a 10year life but are almost always renewed such
that the perpetuity assumption is a reasonable
approximation; reducing the timeframe to 40
or 50 years has little eﬀect on the analysis.) If a
grazing permit yields $168 in nominal income
in just 2 years (and $252 in 3 years, etc.), why
should a permit have a present value, PV,
of only $127? Applying a standard annuity
formula (PV = A/i, where i is the discount rate)
suggests that, if the 2 figures ($127 and $84) are
correct, then ranchers discount future income
at >66%. This is far too high, so something must
be awry.
The problem can be uncovered by going back
to the source document on which the RCI study
relies, which models a representative ranch
located in Elko county of northeastern Nevada
(Alevy et al. 2007). The representative ranch
produced 700 head of cattle and held permits to
4,148 AUMs on federal rangeland, of which 89%
were used, on average, in any given year. When
there were no restrictions on access to federal
land, forage sourced from federal rangelands
accounted for 44% of all AUMs fed. Other
forage sources included leased pasture, deeded
rangelands, produced hay, and purchased hay.
Adjusted to constant $2017 and assuming no
access restrictions, this ranch would have gross
revenues of $350,000, which, after dividing by
4,148 AUMs, yielded the RCI (2017) estimate
of $84/AUM. This actually measures gross
revenue per AUM, not income. Further, it is not
clear why one should attribute 100% of ranch
revenue to federal AUMs, particularly when
federal AUMs comprise only 44% total forage
requirement for the herd. Such an approach
implicitly assumes that ranchers have no forage
options other than federal range.
The Alevy et al. (2007) report showed how
the representative rancher would adjust to
reductions in federal AUMs by reducing
herd size and using more expensive feed
sources, including purchased hay. The authors
simulated federal AUM reductions of 10%,
25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%. An initial 10%
reduction from baseline federal AUMs (a loss
of 415 AUMs) caused ranch income (revenues
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minus costs) to fall by just >$2,220, for an
average opportunity cost (profit loss per AUM
lost) of $5.36 per AUM. Put another way, the
last 415 federal AUMs each added an average
of $5.36 ranch profit. This figure ($5.36) now
squares with the reported present value of a
BLM permit ($127/AUM) because it implies a
much more reasonable discount rate of 4.2%.
A further loss of 622 AUMs yielded a marginal
profit loss of $10.46/AUM and an average profit
loss of $8.42 per AUM on the cumulative loss
of 1,037 AUMs (25% reduction). The 50% AUM
loss scenario implied a marginal loss of another
1,037 AUMs and a cumulative loss of 2,074
AUMs; the loss in marginal profit rose to $12.18
per AUM whereas the average loss in profit
was $10.30 per AUM.
Alevy et al. (2007) estimated average and
marginal opportunity costs for ranchers in
response to access restrictions on federal
rangeland, which can be applied to restrictions
on grazing access regardless of the motivating
issue (e.g., livestock displacement by WHB,
sage-grouse [Centrocercus urophasianus], wildfire
damage, etc.). Returning to the RCI (2017)
study, the confusion between gross revenues
and income means that one should take care in
evaluating not only their reported opportunity
costs, but also their economic impact analysis.
Input-output models will generate diﬀerent
results depending on how changes in the final
demand vector are constructed. It does matter
if the $10.1 million in lost production value
(120,000 lost AUMs multiplied by $84 per
AUM) were treated as foregone ranch income
versus separating it into ranch income (profit)
and production expenditures across diﬀerent
input sectors, each of which will diﬀer in its
income, employment, value-added, and fiscal
multipliers.

Making sense of opportunity cost
estimates
A WHB program will maximize net benefits
when the additional (marginal) benefit of
increasing the AML by 1 animal is equal to
the additional (marginal) cost imposed by
that animal. The marginal opportunity costs
(reported by Bastian et al. 1999 and calculated
from Alevy et al. 2007) are not as useful as
they might be because economists have yet to
estimate the marginal benefit of a wild horse
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or burro on the range. Further, one should
not (as some have done) multiply a marginal
opportunity cost by the number of displaced
AUMs (or animals, depending on the unit of
measure) because this is very likely to provide
an erroneous estimate of total opportunity
costs. Total opportunity costs may be calculated
as an integral of the marginal opportunity cost
function, but this review of the literature did
not reveal such a function.
In contrast, the connection between average
opportunity cost and total opportunity cost
is straightforward: simply multiply average
cost of a lost AUM by the number of displaced
AUMs. For example, RCI (2017) reports a loss
of 120,000 AUMs in the Ely BLM District Oﬃce,
which is a district-wide reduction in federal
AUMs of just >35%. Using the Alevy et al.
(2007) model, average ranch income losses are
$8.42/AUM for the 25% reduction scenario and
$10.30/AUM for the 50% reduction scenario.
Multiplying these average opportunity costs
by 120,000 AUMs means that annual aggregate
profit losses to ranchers in the Ely BLM District
Oﬃce are likely to be in the range of $1.01
million to $1.24 million. This assumes that AUM
reductions were shared proportionately by all
ranchers in the Ely district; if range restrictions
were disproportionately applied to a smaller
group of ranchers then total opportunity
costs would be much higher. Further, these
opportunity estimates do not include costs of
other displaced wildlife; as such, this is a lower
bound on the opportunity cost.
Wild horses and burros can be long-lived
animals, living up to 30 years (de Seve and
Boyles Griﬃn 2013). Sustaining WHB on the
range over lengthy periods of time generates
interest in the cumulative opportunity costs
of WHB, which should be discounted over
time back to a present value. This is where the
permit value of $127/AUM (as reported by RCI
2017) is handy. The permit value is the present
value of profit flowing from perpetual use of the
federal range that, as was demonstrated above,
is consistent with the initial average profit
losses per AUM emanating from the Alevy et
al. 2007 model. At 2017 WHB levels in excess
of the AML for the Ely BLM district, RCI (2017)
found cumulative discounted opportunity
costs estimated to be $15.23 million ($127/AUM
× 120,000 AUMs). Again, a permit value does
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not incorporate opportunity costs associated
with displacement of other species by WHB;
thus, this valuation approach provides only a
lower bound on opportunity costs.

Beneﬁts: economic analysis of
BLM adoption and sales auctions
Economists have devoted some research
eﬀort to the BLM adoption and sales markets,
examining the probability that a given wild
horse with specific characteristics will be
adopted or sold, as well as modeling the fee
received for horses with given characteristics.

Probability of adoption or sale
Three studies have gauged the eﬀect of
horse characteristics (and other factors) on
the probability that a given animal would be
adopted or sold (Table 2). Harris et al. (2005)
and Adekunle (2015) used a stated preference
valuation method (the choice experiment)
based on survey data, whereas Elizondo et al.
(2016) used revealed preference data on actual
adoptions and sales as gathered by the BLM.
Harris et al. (2005) had 2 diﬀerent samples,
resulting in 2 diﬀerent models. The first
sample was composed of participants at a 2005
BLM Wild Horse Expo held in Reno, Nevada;
attendees were asked to drop completed
surveys into a box located at the exhibition hall
exit point. Some 60 respondents completed the
survey, which included 6 questions concerning
hypothetical adoption of a wild horse. A
parallel survey was administered online,
with the sampling frame consisting of Expo
website viewers and listserv members of WHB
groups. The internet survey had 94 completed
surveys; each respondent answered 6 questions
regarding hypothetical adoption of a horse.
Both samples were composed primarily of
experienced horse buyers, with 73% of the onsite sample and 83% of the internet sample
having purchased at least 1 wild horse at a past
BLM auction.
The conjoint choice experiment was similar
across the 2 samples. Respondents were asked to
compare 2 horses that diﬀered in characteristics
and were given the choice of adopting Horse
A, adopting Horse B, or adopting neither horse.
The characteristics included size (ranging
from 10–15 hands), color, bonding (gentle,
inquisitive, or expressive), sex, activity level
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(quiet, active, or wild), and purchase fee. Table
2 reports the sign of the coeﬃcients for each
statistically significant characteristic; a positive
sign means horses with that characteristic were
more likely to be adopted, whereas a negative
sign implies horses with that characteristic
were less likely to be adopted. Characteristics
included in the model but not statistically
significant are marked with N/S; characteristics
that are blank were not included in the reported
model.
The Harris et al. (2015) on-site sample
preferred larger horses, but not too large, as
the negative sign on the quadratic term implies
(Table 2, column 2). Horses that were young
and quiet were more likely to be adopted than
horses that did not share these characteristics.
Relative to black horses, sorrel, bay, and gray
horses were less likely to be adopted. The
internet sample had preferences similar to the
on-site sample. Larger horses were preferred to
smaller, as were horses characterized as quiet
(Table 2, column 3). Expressive horses were not
as likely to be adopted as those that were less
exuberant. Relative to black horses, gray horses
were less likely to be adopted.
Adekunle (2015) employed a survey approach
quite similar to that of Harris et al. (2005) in
that her conjoint choice experiment was an
onsite survey of participants at a BLM wild
horse auction in 2014, this time in Frankfort,
Kentucky, USA. Some 65% of the 56 respondents
had attended ≥2 BLM auctions in the past,
and almost 63% had purchased a wild horse.
Respondents were asked to answer 4 adoption
choice questions using a construction similar
to that of Harris et al. (2005; Horse A, Horse B,
or neither). Characteristics included age, color,
sex (mare or gelding), size, temperament (calm
or nervous), and training (untouched, halterbroke, or started under saddle).
Survey participants preferred larger horses
to smaller ones and were more likely to adopt
horses with some training (halter or saddle;
Table 2 (column 4). Calm horses were also more
likely to be adopted. Relative to black horses,
palominos were more likely to be adopted.
Neither age nor sex were statistically related to
the probability of adoption.
The Harris et al. (2005) and Adekunle
(2015) studies relied upon stated preference
information regarding hypothetical adoption
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of horses in a constructed market; in contrast,
Elizondo et al. (2016) used actual adoption data
included in the BLM Information System. The
vastly increased sample size (114,882 horses
available for adoption from 1997 until 2010)
allowed the authors to examine the influence
of many more characteristics than the studies
reviewed above. Almost 60,300 horses in the
sample were adopted (52.5%), with another
3,800 sold (3.3%). Halter or saddle training had
been provided to 4.2% of the sample (7.6% of all
animals adopted or sold).
As with the previous studies, younger
horses were more likely to be adopted (Table
2, column 5). Stallions were preferred to mares
which, in turn, were preferred to geldings.
Every horse in the sample that had been
trained in some way was adopted, implying
positive coeﬃcients in the model. Relative to
bay or brown horses, horses of any color except
gray or sorrel were more likely to be adopted.
Finally, distinguishing characteristics such as
face whorls, a blaze, or white feet significantly
increase the probability of adoption.

Fees received from adoption or sale
Adekunle et al. (2014) and Elizondo et al.
(2016) used actual BLM auction sales data to
relate horse characteristics to the fee received.
Adekunle et al. (2014) restricted their sample (n
= 93) to only horses who were adopted or sold;
the Elizondo et al. (2016) fee model was the
second stage of a Heckit model that adjusted
parameters to reflect selection of >64,000 horses
from the original sample of almost 115,000
horses. The sample selection portion of the
Elizondo et al. (2016) model was discussed in
the previous section (Table 2, column 5).
Adekunle et al. (2014) did not report an
average adoption or sales fee, but they did
provide several econometric models that related
the fee received to characteristics of the horses
sold (Table 3, column 2). Stallions and mares
received a price premium relative to geldings,
as did horses that had been halter-trained.
Saddle-training did not add to the adoption fee
relative to no training at all. Relative to black
horses, horses with any coloring at all were
conveyed at a higher price. The authors did not
find a statistical relationship between a blaze or
stockings and the fee received.
Adjusted to constant $2017, Elizondo et al.
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Table 2. Models for probability and sale of wild horses (Equus ferus caballus) and burros (E. asinus).
Harris et al. (2005)

Harris et al. (2005)

Type of data

Stated preference

Stated preference Stated preference Revealed preference

Sample size

60 × 6 questions

94 × 6 questions

56 × 4 questions

114,882

Table A2
Model 3

Table A3
Model 3

Table 6.19
Model MNL-0

Table 6
Model 4

Model selected for
comparison

Adekunle (2015)

Elizondo et al. (2016)

Sign of statistically significant variablesa
Size
Size (hands)

+

Size squared

–

+

+

Age
Age 2–6 years old

+

Age 7–10 years old

N/S

N/S

Age at capture

–

Sex (baseline)

(Gelding)

(Mare)

Stallion

+

Gelding

–

Mare

N/S

Trainingb
Halter-trained

+

+

Saddle-trained

+

+

Temperament
Calm/quiet
Gentle

+

–
(Black)

Sorrel

–

Bay

–

Palomino
Gray

+

N/S

Expressive
Color (baseline)

+

(Black)

(Black)

N/S

N/S

N/S
–

+

(Bay or brown)

+

–

White or gray

+

Sorrel or chestnut

N/S

+

Dun, buckskin, or grulla

N/S

+

Roan

+

Black

+

Pinto
Appaloosa

N/S

+
+

Distinguishing
characteristics

a

Face whorls

+

Blaze

+

Any white feet

+

N/S = not statistically significant. A “blank” means this variable was not included in the model specification.
All trained horses in the Elizondo et al. (2016) sample were adopted or sold. The positive sign is implied and
was not included in their model.
b
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Table 3. Models for wild horse (Equus ferus caballus) and (E. asinus) adoptions and
sales.
Estimation method
Sample
Sample size
Model selected for
comparison

Adekunle et al. (2014)

Elizondo et al. (2016)b

OLS

Heckit

Onsite survey of BLM
sale participants

BLM adoption/sales
database

93

63,983

Table 3

Table 7
Model 4

Sign of statistically significant variablesa
Size (hands)

N/S

Age
Age

N/S

Age squared
Sex (baseline)
Stallion

N/S
(Gelding)

(Mare)

+

N/S

Gelding
Mare

N/S

+
+

Training
Halter-trained

+

Saddle-trained

N/S

Any training
Color (baseline)
Any color

+
(Black)

(Bay or brown)

+

Palomino

+

White or gray

+

Sorrel or chestnut

+

Dun, buckskin, or grulla

+

Roan

+

Black

+

Pinto

+

+

Palamino

+

Appaloosa

+

Cremello

+

Distinguishing
characteristics
Blaze or stockings

a

N/S

Face whorls

+

Blaze

+

Anywhite feet

N/S

Visible defect

–

N/S = not statistically significant. A “blank” means this variable was not included in the
model specification.
b
The Elizondo et al. (2016) model is a Heckit model linked to probit adoptions/sales
specification appearing in Table 2.
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(2016) reported an average fee of $191.86 for
adopted horses and $19.60 for sold horses.
One can interpret these figures as marginal
benefits for use in a comprehensive BCA. The
adoption fee received was unrelated to age
(age eﬀects were captured in the selection
model). Stallions generated fees that were not
significantly diﬀerent from those received by
mares, but geldings received a premium of
about $11. Training added about $141 to the
adoption fee. Relative to bay or brown, any
other color added to the adoption fee, ranging
from the $12 premium for sorrel or chestnut
horses, up to the $112 premium garnered by
dun, buckskin, or grulla horses. Other colors
received premia in amounts between these
2 extremes. Distinguishing characteristics
were also of value relative to horses without
such markings: a blaze was worth almost $11
whereas face whorls were worth an additional
$109. Conversely, any visible defects reduced
the adoption fee by just under $26.

Effect of horse slaughter ban on
auction fees
In 2007, all slaughter of horses in the
United States stopped as its last 3 slaughter
plants ceased operations. The plant closures
eliminated any salvage value for horses and
left horse owners responsible for the increased
costs associated with the care and welfare of
horses nearing the end of their lives. A number
of studies have examined the eﬀect of the
slaughter ban on the demand for horses (North
et al. 2005, GAO 2011, Taylor and Sieverkropp
2013, Vestal et al. 2015), finding that the price
for low-quality horses has declined by amounts
that exceed 10%. Wild horses certainly fit
into the low-quality category. Elizondo et al.
(2016) also included a variable capturing the
eﬀects of the slaughter ban. The adoption/fee
model (Tables 2 and 3) suggested that the price
received at BLM auctions for wild horses has
been almost $18 lower since the slaughter ban
went into eﬀect.

Auction structure and fees received
Economists have also studied the eﬀect of
auction structure on the fees received and
the number and value of bids received. For
example, in 2004 the BLM changed its auction
process to include a number of additional
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means of adopting a horse, including auctions
conducted on the internet. The Elizondo et al.
(2016) sales model showed that per-animal
adoption fees have fallen by roughly $100
since then. It is not clear if this is the result of
(1) the change in auction structure, (2) reduced
adoption demand for horses in recent years,
or (3) some combination of the two. That said,
Alevy et al. (2010) reported that bids received
in internet auctions were, on average, less than
bids received at onsite auctions. While both
internet and onsite bids varied according to
horse characteristics (primarily sex and color)
in a manner similar to the pattern (Tables 2
and 3), internet bids were, as a rule, lower than
onsite bids.
Li (2010) examined the eﬀect of “jump
bidding” and “sniping” in WHB internet
auctions. Jump bidding is the act of increasing
one’s bid for an animal in excess of the
minimum required increment ($5) and is
designed to signal aggressive behavior, force
others to prematurely terminate their bidding
activity, and keep the price low. Sniping is
the act of waiting until the last few minutes of
an auction before placing a bid; the goal is to
hide one’s willingness to pay from others in
an attempt to keep the winning bid as low as
possible. Using BLM internet auction data for
adoptions occurring between 2006 and 2008, Li
(2010) reported that >2,300 bids were received
for 505 animals. Of the total number of bids, 623
were jump bids in excess of the $5 minimum
increment. Li (2010) found that each jump bid
increased auction revenue by 0.22%, so that
jump bidding failed in its goal to lower the
final adoption fee. Late bids (sniping), defined
as those that arrive in the last 30 minutes of an
auction, comprised one-third of all bids; 19%
were submitted in the last 5 minutes. Li (2010)
found that late bidding had no eﬀect on auction
revenue and sniping was not an eﬀective
auction strategy.

Intertemporal bioeconomic models
A few studies have examined the longer-term
dynamics of wild horse range management
using bioeconomic models. Such models are
well suited to conducting intertemporal BCA
because they can easily include both benefits
and costs within a dynamic optimization
framework. However, none of the models
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appearing in the literature achieve the ideal of
Hyde’s (1978) BCA model.
Huﬀaker et al. (1990) illustrated the tradeoﬀs
between wild horses and domestic livestock
within an optimal control framework. Their
theoretical model balanced wild horse and
livestock stocking densities to achieve an
ecological balance with range vegetation. Wild
horse populations were managed by periodic
removals from the range, whereas livestock
populations were controlled by changing the
grazing fee charged by the BLM. The objective
function was set up to achieve range conditions
of a quality needed to sustain multiple use
demands. Higher rates of horse removal
allowed the range to support more livestock,
and a lower grazing fee could be charged
while still maintaining desired range quality.
Similarly, lower rates of horse removal, holding
range quality constant, required higher grazing
fees to encourage ranchers to stock fewer
animals. The model solution yielded the jointly
optimal rate of animal removal and stocking fee
needed to achieve multiple-use goals for public
rangeland.
Most intertemporal models of WHB control
found in the literature have been constructed
to minimize the cost of achieving AML goals
rather than maximizing net benefits. Bartholow
(2007) used BLM’s WHB planning tool,
WinEquus, to simulate herd dynamics with
management tools that included diﬀerent time
intervals between WHB removals, changing
population sex ratios, and recurring application
of fertility control. The study was conducted
for 4 herd management areas over a 20-year
time horizon using 100 stochastic simulations.
Simulations diﬀered in initial population size
and structures, along with subsequent animal
survival. Contraceptive treatment was, in
general, found to be cost eﬀective for all but
1 (naturally) slow-growing population. Using
baseline 2004 costs, the most cost-eﬀective
management approach combined application of
contraceptives every 3 years, changing the age
structure of animals targeted for adoption, and
increasing the proportion of females removed
from the range. An annual nationwide savings
of $7.8 million in variable program costs could
result if the most cost-eﬀective strategy were to
be adopted.
Arneson et al. (2002) used a bioeconomic
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model to track program costs as they varied the
length of time between gathers, fertility control
intervals, and sex ratios. Per-horse gather costs
were assumed to decline with the size of the
population in a given herd management area.
Fertility controls were assumed to reduce
annual population growth from 20% to 8.1%.
The authors found that the most cost-eﬀective
strategy was to gather horses every 4 years
and administer 2-year contraceptives to
mares. Results were found to be insensitive
to relatively wide variation in the parameters
chosen for program costs.
de Seve and Boyles Griﬃn (2013) compared the
eﬀect on horse populations under 3 management
approaches: no management, removal only,
and removal and contraception. The authors
simulated a hypothetical herd of almost 900 horses
over a 12-year period; removals occurred during
years 3, 7, and 11. Over the planning horizon, the
number of horses removed to long-term holding
pastures was reduced by 55% and managers
came closer to satisfying the AML. Relative to a
removals-only policy, the present value of total
costs for a removal and contraception policy was
reduced by $3.7 million (35%) over 12 years at a
single-herd management area. Again, there was
no attempt to measure benefits as defined by
Hyde (1978).
A recent study by Fonner and Bohara (2017)
used an optimal control model to determine
how to achieve herd levels with animal
removals only, fertility control only, and a
combined removal/contraceptive program. This
model departs from others in that the objective
function includes a measure of benefits. The
benefits function, though, did not match that
envisioned by Hyde (1978). Instead, the authors’
benefit function was constructed to include
use and nonuse net benefits of the marginal
costs as estimated by Bastian et al. (1999). To
understand their approach, go back to Hyde’s
(1978) equation and set total benefits equal to
total costs, and then subtract opportunity costs
from both sides of the equation. The benefits
function is now, UV(AML) + NUV(AML) +
ASV(AML) – OC(AML). Use, nonuse, and
adoption benefits were not estimated by Fonner
and Bohara (2017); instead, marginal benefits,
net of marginal opportunity costs, were set
equal to zero at the selected AML. That is, the
maintained assumption is that the BLM had
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chosen the AML needed to maximize benefits.
Despite the implausibility of the assumption,
it cleverly allows the authors to parameterize
a complex, dynamic model in the absence
of information about benefits. The study’s
inclusion of opportunity costs results in a more
broad-based analysis than the other bioeconomic
studies reviewed in this section.
Cost information, gathered from a variety of
sources, was used to develop state-level models
for Oregon and Nevada. Three policy options
were examined for each state over a 50-year
planning horizon. The model demonstrated that
a fertility control-only policy was not eﬀective
at controlling on-range populations and thus
generated the lowest net benefits and left the
largest number of free-roaming animals. In fact,
the fertility control-only program was found to
raise costs over status quo program expenses
in both states. In both states, a removal-only
management policy achieved on-range freeroaming populations similar to that of a hybrid
removal-and-fertility policy. However, the
number of animals in LTH was greater under
a removal-only policy, resulting in higher
costs relative to a hybrid program. The model
for Nevada found LTH populations under
the hybrid program just slightly lower than a
removal-only policy, but Oregon’s higher rate
of adoption resulted in an LTH population
under the hybrid approach that was about
half that of the removal-only option. Both
the removal-only and the hybrid program in
Nevada generated substantial cost savings
relative to the status quo (about $1.3 billion
over 50 years). Optimal herd management in
Oregon under either a removal-only or hybrid
program generated cost savings of about $300
million over 50 years.

Summary
Forty years have passed since Hyde (1978)
first outlined 6 primary categories of benefits
and costs needed to conduct a full economic
analysis of WHB management on public
lands. This survey of the literature has found
far more emphasis on program costs—the
costs of gathering, holding, and adopting out
horses and burros—than on any of the other 5
elements of benefit and cost. Program costs are
explicit expenditures readily found in public
documents and relatively easy to quantify,
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so this is not a surprise. What is surprising is
the relative paucity of other cost and benefit
information.
Only 1 study (Bastian et al. 1999) explicitly
measures the opportunity cost of displacement
of wildlife species (elk, mule deer, and
pronghorn) that share the range with WHB.
These authors base opportunity costs on
foregone hunting values and do not include
any foregone nonuse values associated with
the displaced species. Thus, even this study
underestimates the opportunity costs of
displaced wildlife. Further, the opportunity cost
estimate is unique to the portion of Wyoming
studied; as Hyde (1978) anticipated long ago,
the type of species and the number of animals
displaced by WHB may vary geographically,
so one should be wary of simply transferring
the Bastian et al. (1999) estimate without
considering its applicability to the region under
study.
A much easier opportunity cost to gauge is
the value of displaced commercial livestock.
Bastian et al. (1999) included commercial
opportunity costs, as did RCI (2017) and Alevy
et al. (2007). As demonstrated with the Alevy et
al. (2007) model, the opportunity costs may be
estimated from any study that examines changes
in federal AUMs. Again, the opportunity cost
per AUM may vary geographically—relatively
low where comparably priced substitutes to
federal rangeland are available and higher
where they are not. If one is fortunate to have
a representative ranch model developed for a
region of interest, then the analysis of AUM
losses due to WHB may be transferred from
studies conducted for other purposes, such
as habitat restoration or wildfire damages. A
closely related approach may use livestock
production budgets that are produced by
extension personnel in many states. A livestock
budget provides a snapshot of output, inputs,
prices, and profit for a representative farm.
While less dynamic than representative farm
programming models, one could work with
livestock extension agents and the production
budget to estimate losses in profit (opportunity
costs) associated with more limited access to
federal rangeland.
I could find no studies quantifying, in dollar
terms, the ecological damages caused by excess
WHB populations. Estimating ecological losses
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Figure 4. Excessive utilization wild horses in the
Antelope Complex in Nevada, USA. Estimating
ecological losses associated with changing feral
horse (Equus ferus caballus) populations will
undoubtedly be challenging (photo courtesy of the
Bureau of Land Management).

associated with changing WHB populations is
undoubtedly a challenging prospect (Figure
4). At a minimum, such a study would require
the involvement of a multidisciplinary team
to document the physical damages to the
rangeland at diﬀerent WHB population levels,
translate those damages into descriptions that
are meaningful to people, and then conduct
a cost survey using up-to-date non-market
valuation methods (Boyle 2017, Brown 2017).
Turning to the benefits side, only 1 of the 3
benefit categories (adoption and sales value)
has seen any work by economists. Though the
number of adoption studies is relatively small,
the results are remarkably consistent across
studies and identify the characteristics of
horses most likely to be adopted. In particular,
every horse with some training in the BLM
database was adopted and received a $141
premium (Elizondo et al. 2016). Given the cost
of long-term holding (about $570 per year),
the payoﬀ to training horses prior to auction is
substantial. Further, the database maintained
by the BLM allows one to estimate an adoption
value. Assuming the scale of adoption activity
remains at historical levels, the average fee
received for an adopted animal could be used
as a reasonable approximation of the marginal
benefit of adoption.
In contrast to the adoption/sales literature,
economists have conducted no studies to
estimate the use value of viewing WHB or
the nonuse value of having WHB on public
rangeland. A relatively small “wild horse and
tourism” literature exists but does not estimate
use values in a way that can be employed in
a benefit cost analysis (see, for example, the
review by Notzke 2016). Rosenberger (2018)
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regularly updates a database of recreational
use values, which is currently composed of
421 studies conducted between 1958 and 2015.
The database includes a large number of value
estimates for wildlife viewing (at an average of
just >$59 per person per day), but the majority
of these studies are not for a specific species—
only wildlife viewing as a general activity. To
the degree that wildlife-viewing studies focus
on a type of animal, they generally focus on
birds, or a particular species of bird. Very few
wildlife-viewing studies concern mammals,
and the majority of those are for elk. Absent
a use value study for WHB viewing, one must
engage in a benefit transfer (Rosenberger and
Loomis 2017). If, for example, a researcher
happened to have an estimate of the number
of people viewing WHB on a given herd
management area, a simple way to gauge
the WHB benefit would be to multiply the
number of visitor days by the $59 per person
per day values. This estimate of use benefits
would surely be fraught with error, but at least
one would be making a step toward a more
complete benefit cost analysis.
Relative to adoption values or use values,
estimating nonuse values for any species
under any circumstances is both diﬃcult and
controversial. Nonuse values are estimated by
stated preference models, which are diﬃcult
to master, expensive to administer, and often
attacked (Hausman 2012, Bishop and Boyle
2017, Boyle 2017). Still, the fervor with which
people advocate on behalf of WHB—even
when they have no intention of adopting a
horse or making a visit to view them—would
suggest strongly held nonuse values for freeroaming WHB (Hayden 2016, Shaer 2017).
A study would need to establish not just an
estimate of nonuse value, but also the size of
the population holding such values.
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